

# Program Anomaly Detection: Methodology and Practices

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## ABSTRACT

This tutorial will present an overview of program anomaly detection, which analyzes normal program behaviors and discovers aberrant executions caused by attacks, misconfigurations, program bugs, and unusual usage patterns. It was first introduced as an analogy between intrusion detection for programs and the immune mechanism in biology. Advanced models have been developed in the last decade and comprehensive techniques have been adopted such as hidden Markov model and machine learning.

We will introduce the audience to the problem of program attacks and the anomaly detection approach against threats. We will give a general definition for program anomaly detection and derive model abstractions from the definition. The audience will be walked through the development of program anomaly detection methods from early-age  $n$ -gram approaches to complicated pushdown automata and probabilistic models. Some lab tools will be provided to help understand primitive detection models. This procedure will help the audience understand the objectives and challenges in designing program anomaly detection models. We will discuss the attacks that subvert anomaly detection mechanisms. The field map of program anomaly detection will be presented. We will also briefly discuss the applications of program anomaly detection in Internet of Things security. We expect the audience to get an idea of unsolved challenges in the field and develop a sense of future program anomaly detection directions after attending the tutorial.

## Keywords

Anomaly detection; intrusion detection; program trace; program analysis; formal language; detection accuracy

## 1. INTRODUCTION

Program attacks are one of the oldest and fundamental threats to computing systems, which evolve and constitute latest attack vectors and advanced persistent threats.

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Anomaly-based intrusion detection discovers aberrant executions caused by attacks, misconfigurations, program bugs, and unusual usage patterns. The approach models normal program behaviors instead of the threats. It does not bear time lags between emerging attacks and deployed countermeasures as standard defenses do, which are built upon retrospects of inspected attacks. The merit of program anomaly detection is its independence from attack signatures. This property enables proactive defenses against new and unknown threats.

Program anomaly detection systems (a.k.a. host-based intrusion detection systems) follow Denning's intrusion detection vision [1]. Conventional systems were designed to detect illegal control flows or anomalous system calls based on two primitive paradigms: *i*)  $n$ -gram short call sequence validation that was introduced by Forrest et al. [2]; and *ii*) automaton transition verification, which was first described by Kosoresow and Hofmeyr [5] (DFA) and formalized by Sekar et al. [7] (FSA) and Wagner and Dean [10] (NDPDA). The two paradigms were advanced with machine learning models [6], hidden Markov models [11, 3, 13, 12], and neural network models.

The detection accuracy of program anomaly detection methods relies on the description precision of normal program behaviors and the completeness of the training [9]. Early-age program attacks, e.g., return addresses manipulation and library/system call injection, incur great variation from normal behaviors. Thus, they can be distinguished from relatively imprecise descriptions of normal program behaviors, e.g.,  $n$ -gram system call anomaly detection [2] – regular grammar description of system call traces. However, modern program attacks utilize indirect means of control flow manipulation, e.g., data-oriented programming [4], or abuse programs within legal control flows, e.g., denial of service attacks (DoS). The emerging stealthy attacks diminish the effectiveness of conventional anomaly-based intrusion detection models and lead to the development of new models, e.g., long trace event correlation analysis [8], describing program behaviors through context-sensitive grammar.

This tutorial aims to give the audience an overview of program anomaly detection and inspire people to explore future directions and solve open issues. The tutorial will explain program anomaly detection from both practical and theoretical perspectives, presenting a field map for the audience to understand the evolution of the field as well as potential future directions.

We outline the sketch of the tutorial below and describe the subtopics in the following sections.

- Introduction to program attacks and primitive anomaly detection paradigms.
- Formal definition of program anomaly detection and the evolution of detection systems.
- A tale of two paths: program anomaly detection and control-flow enforcement.
- Unsolved issues and possible future directions.

## 2. PREREQUISITE KNOWLEDGE

System security researchers at all levels are welcome to the tutorial. We aim to *i*) introduce the problem of program anomaly detection to junior researchers/students, and *ii*) discuss the formalization of the problem, unsolved issues and possible future directions with senior researchers/students. A basic understanding of system security is required, e.g., call stack operations, buffer overflow and countermeasures, protection rings, control flows in programs. Related and advanced knowledge like automata theory, hidden Markov model, machine learning mechanisms, or correlation analysis, are not required, but could help develop a deeper understanding of some subtopics in the tutorial.

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