# REASONING ABOUT INFINITE COMPUTATION PATHS (extended abstract)

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#### Abstract

We investigate extensions of temporal logic by finite automata on infinite words. There are three different types of acceptance conditions (finite, looping and repeating) that one can give for these finite automata. This gives rise to three different logics. It turns out, however, that these logics have the same expressive power but differ in the complexity of their decision problem. We also investigate the addition of alternation and show that it does not increase the complexity of the decision problem.

## 1. Introduction

For many years, logics of programs were tools for reasoning about the input/output behavior of programs. When dealing with concurrent or non-terminating processes (like operating systems) there is, however, a need to reason about infinite computation paths. These are the sequences of states that the computation goes through. In the propositional case they can be viewed as infinite sequences of propositional truth assignments. In [Pn77], temporal logic was proposed to reason about such sequences. Later it was incorporated into the process logics of [Ni80] and [HKP80]. For reasoning about propositional truth assignments, propositional logic is a descriptively complete language, i.e., it can specify any set of propositional truth assignments. However, for reasoning about computation paths there is no a priori robust notion of descriptive completeness. In [GPSS80] propositional temporal logic (PTL) was shown to be expressively equivalent to the monadic first-order theory of (N, <), the natural numbers with the less-than relation. This was taken as an indication that PTL is "descriptively complete", and that so are the process logics based on it [Ni80,HKP80].

The above claim is based on the assumption that first-order notions are all we need to reason about computation paths. But, the very fundamental notion of regular sequences of events is not first-order. And, it turns out that regular sequences are a natural way of describing concurrent processes [Sh79, Mi80]. Moreover, even a simple property like "the proposition p holds at least in every other state on a path" is not expressible in *PTL* [Wo81].

In view of the need to extend the expressive power of PTL, different approaches can be taken. The mathematician would probably choose to add some nonfirst-order construct, like least-fixpoint or second-order quantification. The computer scientist, on the other hand, would probably choose to add a mechanism to specify regular events as was done in [Wo81]. There, PTL is extended with a temporal connective corresponding to every nondeterministic finite automaton. For

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example, if  $\Sigma = \{a, b\}$  and A is the automaton accepting all words over  $\Sigma$  having a in every other position, then A is also a binary temporal connective, and the formula A(p, true) is satisfied by the paths where p holds in at least every other state. Note that automata connectives can be nested within each other.

An important point that was not considered in [Wo81] is that, while the notion of regularity for finite paths is quite robust, this is not the case for infinite paths. One can think of three ways of defining acceptance of an infinite word by a nondeterministic finite automaton. We can say that the automaton accepts the word if (1) it accepts some prefix of it by the standard notion of acceptance for finite words, (2) if it has some infinite run over the word (this is the notion used in [Wo81]), or (3) it has some infinite run over the word where the set of states that repeat infinitely often in this run satisfies some additional constraint, e.g., it contains some specific state. We call these notions of acceptance finite acceptance, looping acceptance, and repeating acceptance, respectively. Repeating acceptance is the notion used in Büchi automata [Bu62]. The languages defined by Büchi automata are the same as those definable by  $\omega$ -regular expressions [McN66]. The two other notions of acceptance are incomparable and define strictly smaller classes of languages. (For example, the sequence  $(ab^*)^{\omega}$ can be defined by repeating acceptance but not by finite or looping acceptance.) Thus, depending on which acceptance conditions one chooses, different logics can be defined and we could expect them to have different expressive powers.

The main result of the paper is that all these logics are expressively equivalent. They all have the expressive power of  $\omega$ -regular expressions, which by [Bu62] and [McN66] is the same as that of the monadic second-order theory of (N, <), denoted S1S. The complexity of the decision problem for these logics ranges from polynomial space to exponential space, whereas S1S is nonelementary [Me75]. The principal technique is the maximal model technique [Pr79] viewed in a new light. While it was previously seen as a model building technique, we use it as a technique to synthesize automata that recognize models. We see this as yet another indication to the relevance of automata theory to the logic of programs (see for example [St81]). Furthermore, our results have an interesting interpretation from a purely automata-theoretic point of view. The ability to have an automata operator nested within another automata operator is essentially equivalent to the ability of an automaton to consult an oracle. That is, when the automaton reaches certain states it asks the oracle whether it accepts the rest of the word, and its next move depends on the answer. Consider now the following hierarchy. Let  $A_0$  be the class of nondeterministic finite automata, let  $A_i$  be the class of nondeterministic finite automata with oracles from  $A_{i-1}$ , and let A be  $\bigcup_{i\geq 0} A_i$ . If C is a class of automata, then  $\overline{C}$  denotes the class of languages defined by automata in C.

Now we have three hierarchies  $A^{f}$ ,  $A^{l}$ , and  $A^{r}$ , depending whether we use finite, looping, or repeating acceptance, respectively. Our results show that not only do these hierarchies collapse but that they are also equivalent:  $\overline{A^{f}} = \overline{A^{l}} = \overline{A^{l}} = \overline{A^{l}} = \overline{A^{l}} = \overline{A^{l}}$ . However, since each complementation causes at least an exponential blow-up, we might have expected the complexity of the emptiness problem for automata in  $A^f$ ,  $A^l$ , and A'to be non-elementary. Our results show that the problem is in PSPACE for  $A^{f}$  and  $A^{l}$  and is in EXPSPACE for A' (compare this with the non-elementariness of the emptiness problem for regular expressions with complement [MS73]). From an automata-theoretic point of view. our main technique, the maximal technique, is a construction that unifies the classical subset construction for determinizing finite automata and the flag construction of [Ch74] for running several automata in parallel under central control.

Finally, to explore the full power of our technique, we introduce *alternating* finite automata connectives. These can be exponentially more succinct than nondeterministic automata connectives, and one may expect their introduction to push the complexity of the logic up. Surprisingly, this is not the case. In fact, we view alternating automata as capturing the quintessence of the maximal model technique.

Though we have chosen temporal logic as the framework for this investigation, our results can also be stated in the framework of propositional dynamic logic [FL79]. We discuss this in the concluding section of the paper.

### 2. Temporal Logic with Automata Connectives

We consider propositional temporal logic where the temporal operators are defined by finite automata, similarly to the extended temporal logic (ETL) of [Wo81]. More precisely, we consider formulas built from a set P of atomic propositions by means of:

- Boolean connectives
- Automata connectives. That is, every nondeterministic finite automaton A = (Σ,S,R,s<sub>0</sub>,F), where Σ is the input alphabet {a<sub>1</sub>,..., a<sub>n</sub>}, S is the set of states, R:Σ×S→2<sup>S</sup> is the transition relation, s<sub>0</sub>∈S is the initial state, and F⊆S is a set of accepting states (or a set of repeating states, see below), is considered as an *n*-ary temporal connective. That is, if f<sub>1</sub>,..., f<sub>n</sub> are formulas, then so is A(f<sub>1</sub>,..., f<sub>n</sub>).

A structure for our logic is an infinite sequence of truth assignments, i.e., a function  $\pi: N \rightarrow 2^P$  that assigns truth values to the atomic propositions in each state. We use  $\pi^i$  to denote the *i*-th "tail" of  $\pi$ , i.e.,  $\pi^i(k) = \pi(k+i)$ . We now define satisfaction of formulas and runs of formulas  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n)$  over sequences by mutual induction. Satisfaction of a formula f by a structure  $\pi$  is denoted  $\pi \models f$ .

- for an atomic proposition  $p, \pi \models p$  if  $p \in \pi(0)$ .
- $\pi \models f_1 \land f_2$  if  $\pi \models f_1$  and  $\pi \models f_2$ .
- $\pi \models \neg f$  if not  $\pi \models f$ .
- $\pi \models A(f_1, \ldots, f_n)$ , where  $A = (\Sigma, S, R, s_0, F)$ , if there is an accepting run  $s = s_0, s_1, \cdots$  of  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n)$  over  $\pi$ .
- A run of a formula  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n)$ , where  $A = (\Sigma, S, R, s_0, F)$ , over a structure  $\pi$  is a sequence  $s = s_0, s_1, \cdots$  of states from S where for all i,  $0 \le i < |s|$ , there is some  $a_j \in \Sigma$  such that  $\pi^i \models f_j$  and  $s_{i+1} \in R(a_j, s_i)$ .

Depending on how we define accepting runs, we get three different versions of the logic:

- $ETL_f$ : A run s is accepting iff some state  $s \in F$  occurs in s.
- ETL<sub>1</sub>: A run s is accepting iff it is infinite.
- $ETL_r$ : A run s is accepting iff some state  $s \in F$  occurs infinitely often in s (Büchi acceptance).

Every formula defines a set of sequences, the set of sequences that satisfies it. Our yardstick for measuring the expressive power of all these logics is their ability to define sets of sequences.

Example: Consider the automaton

$$A_1 = (\{s_0, s_1\}, s_0, \{s_0 \times a \rightarrow s_1, s_1 \times b \rightarrow s_0\}, \emptyset)$$

defined over the alphabet  $\Sigma = \{a,b\}$ . If we consider looping acceptance, it only accepts one word:  $w = ababababab \cdots$ . It thus defines an  $ETL_l$  connective such that  $A_1(f_1, f_2)$  is true of a sequence iff  $f_1$  is true in every even state and  $f_2$  is true in every odd state of that sequence.

#### 3. Translations to Automata and Decision Procedure.

Sequences of truth assignments to the propositional variables in P can be viewed as infinite words over the alphabet  $2^{P}$ . It is not hard to show that our logics are translatable into S1S, and hence, by [Bu62] and [McN66], they define  $\omega$ -regular sets of words. That is, there is a translation from each of the logics  $ETL_{f}$ ,  $ETL_{l}$ , and  $ETL_{r}$  to Büchi automata. However, since negation in front of automata connectives causes an exponential blow-up, we might have expected the complexity of the translation to be non-elementary, as is the translation from S1S to Büchi automata [Bu62]. Not so.

Theorem 3.1: Given an  $ETL_f$  or an  $ETL_l$  formula f of length l, one can construct a Büchi automaton of size exp(l) that accepts exactly those sequences that satisfy f. Sketch of Proof: We will give the proof for  $ETL_f$ . The proof for  $ETL_l$  is similar. Given an  $ETL_f$  formula f, the construction of the Büchi automaton proceeds in three steps. First, we construct the local automaton for the formula. This automaton checks for "local inconsistencies" in the model, i.e., it checks for inconsistencies between consecutive states. For a formula  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n)$  to be satisfied, the automaton A has to reach an accepting state. This condition, which we call an eventuality, is not checked by the local automaton. Thus we construct a second automaton, the eventuality automaton whose purpose is to impose these eventuality conditions. Finally, the construction combines the local and eventuality automata.

Before giving the construction, we need to define

the notion of the closure of an  $ETL_f$  formula f, denoted cl(f). It is similar in nature to the closure defined for PDL in [FL79]. Given an automaton  $A = (\Sigma, S, R, s_0, F)$ , for each  $s \in S$  we define  $A_s$  to be the automaton  $(\Sigma, S, R, s, F)$ . The closure is then defined as follows:

- $f \in cl(f)$
- $f_1 \wedge f_2 \in cl(f) \rightarrow f_1, f_2 \in cl(f)$
- $\neg f_1 \in cl(f) \rightarrow f_1 \in cl(f)$
- $f_1 \in cl(f)$  not of the form  $\neg f_2 \rightarrow \neg f_1 \in cl(f)$
- $A(f_{1},\ldots,f_{n})\in cl(f) \rightarrow f_{1},\ldots,f_{n}\in cl(f)$
- $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in cl(f) \rightarrow A_s(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in cl(f),$ for all  $s \in S$ .

If we define the size of an automata connective to be equal to the number of states of the automaton, then for an  $ETL_f$  formula f, the size of cl(f) can easily be seen to be at most 2l where l is the length of f.

# Constructing the Local Automaton

The local automaton is  $L = (2^{cl(f)}, N_L, \rho_L, N_f, N_L)$ . The state set  $N_L$  will be the set of all sets X of formulas in cl(f) that do not have any propositional inconsistency. Namely they must satisfy the following conditions (we identify a formula g with  $\neg \neg g$ ):

- $g \in X$  iff  $\neg g \notin X$ .
- $g_1 \land g_2 \in X$  iff  $g_1 \in X$  and  $g_2 \in X$ .

For the transition relation  $\rho_L$ , we have that  $Y \in \rho_L(a,X)$  iff a = X and:

- for all  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in X$ , where  $A = (\Sigma, S, R, s, F)$ , either  $s \in F$  or there are an  $f_j$  and an s' such that  $f_j \in X$ ,  $s' \in R(a_j, s)$ , and  $A_s(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in Y$ .
- for all  $\neg A(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in X$ , where  $A = (\Sigma, S, R, s, F)$ ,  $s \notin F$ , and for all  $f_j$  such that  $f_j \in X$ , if  $s' \in R(a_j, s)$  then  $\neg A_s(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in Y$ .

Finally, the set of starting states  $N_f$  consists of all sets X such that  $f \in X$ . The local automaton does not impose any acceptance conditions. However, the infinite sequences that correspond to paths through the local automaton satisfy the formula f except possibly for eventualities. That is, if we have a formula of the form  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n)$ , nothing requires that an accepting state of the automaton A will ever be reached. We now build the eventuality automaton that will ensure that the eventuality formulas are indeed satisfied.

# The Eventuality Automaton

Given an  $ETL_f$  formula f, we defined the set e(f) of its eventualities as the subset of cl(f) that contains all formulas of the form  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n)$ . The eventuality automaton is  $E = (2^{cl(f)}, 2^{e(f)}, \rho_E, \{\emptyset\}, \{\emptyset\})$ , where for the transition relation  $\rho_E$ , we have that  $Y \in \rho_E(a, X)$  iff:

- $X = \emptyset$  and for all  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in a$ , where  $A = (\Sigma, S, R, s, F)$ , either  $s \in F$  or there are an  $f_j$ and an s' such that  $f_j \in a$ ,  $s' \in R(a_j, s)$ , and  $A_s(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in Y$ .
- $X \neq \emptyset$  and for all  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in X$ , where  $A = (\Sigma, S, R, s, F)$ , either  $s \in F$  or there are an  $f_j$  and an s' such that  $f_j \in a$ ,  $s' \in R(a_j, s)$ , and  $A_s(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in Y$ .

Intuitively, the eventuality automaton tries to satisfies the eventualities in the model. When the current state is  $\emptyset$ , it looks at the model to see which eventualities have to be satisfied. Then, the current state says which eventualities have yet to be satisfied. Observe that E does not try to satisfy the eventualities of each state of the model. Since, however, the model is infinite, it suffices to satisfy the eventualities infinitely often. Note that as opposed to what happens in PTL, the satisfaction of eventualities can not be imposed by requiring the appearance of certains states, but rather sequences of states have to be considered.

# Combining the Automata

To ensure that paths through the local automaton are actual models of the  $ETL_f$  formula, we combine it with the eventuality automaton to get the model automaton. The model automaton  $M = (2^{cl(f)}, N_M, \rho_M, N_{M0}, F_M)$  is obtained by taking the cross product of L and E. Its sets of states is  $N_M = N_T \times 2^{e(f)}$ . The transition relation  $\rho_M$  is defined as follows:  $(Y,Z) \in \rho_M(a, (W,X))$  iff  $Y \in \rho_L(a, W)$  and  $Z \in \rho_E(a, X)$ . The set of starting states is  $N_{M0} = N_f \times \{\emptyset\}$ , and the set of repeating states is  $F_M = N_L \times \{\emptyset\}$ .

The automaton M is a Büchi automaton. That is, it is an automaton on infinite strings and the strings accepted are those for which the intersection between the states visited infinitely often and  $F_M$  is nonempty.

The automaton we have constructed, accepts strings over  $2^{cl(f)}$ . However, the models of f are defined

by strings over  $2^{P}$ . So, the last step of our construction is to take the projection of our automaton on  $2^{P}$ . This is done by mapping each element  $b \in 2^{cl(f)}$  into all elements  $a \in 2^{P}$  such that  $b \cap P \subseteq a$ .

The size of both the local and eventuality automata is at most  $2^{cl(I)}$ . Thus for a formula of length *l*, the size of the model automaton constructed is at most  $2^{4l}$ .

The construction described above simultaneously takes care of running automata in parallel, when we have an automata connective nested within another automata connective, and complementing automata, when we have a complemented automata connective. Thus the construction can be viewed as combining the classical subset construction and Choueka's "flag construction" in [Ch74]. It is interesting the compare this technique to Pratt's model construction technique [Pr79]. There one starts by building a maximal model, and then one eliminates states whose eventualities are not satisfied. Our local automata correspond to those maximal models. However, instead of eliminating states, we combine the local automata with eventuality automata that check for satisfaction of eventualities. This construction always yields automata whose size is exponential in the size of the formula. We could also construct our automata using the tableau technique of [Pr80]. This technique can sometimes be more efficient than the maximal model technique.

Theorem 3.2: Given an  $ETL_r$  formula f of length l, one can construct a Büchi automaton of size  $exp^3(l)$  that accepts exactly those sequences that satisfy f.

Idea of Proof: The maximal technique is not applicable here, because the subset construction is not applicable to Büchi automata. Instead, we use McNaughton's construction [McN66] for complementing Büchi automata and the flag construction [Ch74] to combine all the automata that occur in f.

The constructions of Theorems 3.1-3.2 also give us decision procedures for the various logics, since to check whether a formula f is satisfiable it suffices to check that the synthesized automaton accepts some word (the so called *emptiness problem*). This will cost exponential time for  $ETL_f$  and  $ETL_l$  and triply exponential time for  $ETL_r$ . We can, however, do better by realizing that it is not necessary to synthesize the Büchi automaton given b, the theorems. Rather, it suffices to non-deterministically

guess a path through the automaton and check whether this path leads to acceptance. This is quite simple for  $ETL_f$  and  $ETL_l$ , but doing it for  $ETL_r$  requires a thorough understanding of McNaughton's construction. Combining it with the fact that *PTL* is PSPACE-hard [SC82], we get:

Theorem 3.3: The satisfiability problem for  $ETL_f$  and  $ETL_i$  is logspace complete in PSPACE<sup>†</sup>, and the satisfiability problem for  $ETL_r$  is in EXPSPACE.

The applicability of the maximal model method to  $ETL_f$  and  $ETL_I$  also enables us to get a sound and complete axiomatization for these logics.

## 4. Translations Among the logics

The results of the previous section show that  $ETL_r$  has the same expressive power as Büchi automata. Since the notions of finite and looping acceptance are weaker than the notions of repeating acceptance, it would have been conceivable for  $ETL_f$  and  $ETL_l$  to be less expressive than  $ETL_r$ . We show, however, that they have the same expressive power.

Theorem 4.1: Given an  $ETL_r$  formula f of length l, one can construct an  $ETL_f$  formula f' and an  $ETL_l$  formula f'', both of length  $O(exp^3(l))$ , that are satisfied by exactly the same sequences as f.

**Proof:** We give the proof for  $ETL_f$ , the proof for  $ETL_l$  is similar. The proof will show how an  $ETL_r$  formula  $A(f_1,...,f_n)$  can be translated into  $ETL_f$ . The main difficulty is to express in  $ETL_f$  the condition imposed by the repetition set of the nondeterministic Büchi automaton. This can be done by using a deterministic version of the formula.

#### Determinizing the Formula

We want to express  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n)$  in terms of automata connectives that are deterministic in the sense that, given a structure, there will be at most one run of the formula over that structure. The nondeterminism we have to deal with is double. First, one can have several transitions labeled by the same letter coming from the same state. Secondly, a given state in a given structure may satisfy more than one  $f_i$ .

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>†</sup> Satisfiability of  $ETL_1$  was originally shown to be PSPACEcomplete by a different technique in [Wo82] and, though with a flaw in the proof, in [SC82].

To overcome the second type of nondeterminism, we replace  $A = (\Sigma, S, R, s, F)$  by an automaton over  $2^{\Sigma}$ . the automaton is  $A' = (2^{\Sigma}, S, R', s, F)$ , where the transition relation R' is defined as follows:  $s_i \in R'(X, s_j)$  iff  $s_i \in R(a, s_j)$  for some  $a \in X$ . Now,  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n)$  is equivalent to  $A'(g_1, \ldots, g_{2^n})$ , where the formula  $g_i$ corresponding to a set  $X_i \subseteq \Sigma$  is  $(\bigwedge_{a_j \in X_i} f_j) \land (\bigwedge_{a_j \in X_i} \neg f_j)$ . Clearly, in a given state exactly one  $g_i$  is satisfied.

We now have to deal with the nondeterminism of the first kind. Unlike finite automata over finite words, nondeterministic Büchi automata are more powerful than deterministic Büchi automata. In order to be able to determinize our automata, we need the more general notion of acceptance of infinite words due to Muller [Mu63]. This acceptance condition is specified by a collection F of subsets of S. An automaton whose acceptance condition is specified by F accepts an infinite word w if it has a run over w where the set of states that repeat infinitely often belongs to F. It is shown in [McN66] that every *n*-state Büchi automaton is equivalent to a  $O(exp^2(n))$ -state deterministic Muller automaton. We can extend the definition of ETL, in the obvious way to include Muller automata connectives. Furthermore, if  $\mathbf{F} = \{F_1, \ldots, F_n\}$  and  $A_i$  is the Muller automaton  $(\Sigma, S, R, s, \{F_i\})$ , then

$$A(g_1,\ldots,g_m)=\bigvee_{i=1}^n A_i(g_1,\ldots,g_m)$$

So, we only need to show how a formula  $A(g_1, \ldots, g_m)$ , where A is a Muller automaton  $(\Sigma, S, R, s, \{F\})$  can be translated into  $ETL_f$ . The automaton  $A(g_1, \ldots, g_m)$ has exactly one infinite run over any given structure.

# Expressing Repetition

Let s' be any state in F. The formula  $A(g_1, \ldots, g_m)$  is satisfied by a given structure, if the run over the structure reaches the state s', and from that point,  $A(g_1, \ldots, g_m)$  has an infinite run starting with s' and going only through states from F. This last property is expressed by the  $ETL_f$  formula  $\varphi = \neg A'(g_1, \ldots, g_m)$ , where  $A' = (\Sigma, S, R, s', S - F)$ . Thus  $A(g_1, \ldots, g_m)$  is satisfied if the run reaches s' and at that point  $\varphi$  is

satisfied. To express this we add to S a new accepting state e, we add to  $\Sigma$  a new letter a, and we extend the transition relation by R(a,s')=e. Let the extended automaton be  $B = (\Sigma \cup \{a\}, S \cup \{e\}, R \cup (a,s',e), s, \{e\})$ . Now, the  $ETL_f$  formula  $B(g_1, \ldots, g_m, \varphi)$  is satisfied by a structure iff the formula  $A(g_1, \ldots, g_m)$  is satisfied by the structure.

# Complexity of the translation

The deterministic automaton is of size two exponentials in the size of the Büchi automaton. But, the set F of sets of repeating states in the deterministic version can contain a number of elements exponential in the size of that automaton. The whole translation is thus three exponentials.

Theorems 3.1 and 4.1 together provide a translation between  $ETL_f$  and  $ETL_l$ . That translation, however, is quadruply exponential. We can do much better.

Theorem 4.2: There is a one exponential translation between  $ETL_f$  and  $ETL_l$ .

Idea of Proof: For an automaton A, let A' be the automaton constructed from A by the subset construction. The key idea is that looping rejection of an infinite word by A means that A' reaches  $\emptyset$  on this word, and finite rejection means that A' loops on sets that do not contain accepting states. Thus, looping and finite acceptance are in some sense dual notions. The translation between the logics proceeds by applying the subset construction to the automata connectives and then complementing them.

It is also interesting to note that our logics are expressively equivalent to a quantified version of temporal logic. However quantified temporal logic is, like S1S, of non-elementary complexity (the number of exponentials depends on the alternation of quantifiers).

## 5. Alternating Temporal Logic

The results of the preceding sections show that the maximal model technique is applicable to automata connectives and to the negation of automata connectives. This suggests that this technique can also deal with alternation.

Given a set S of states, let us denote by  $B_S$  the set of all Boolean formulas that use the states in S as variables. Members of  $B_S$  can be viewed as Boolean-valued functions on  $2^S$ . Let  $\varphi \in B_S$  and  $S' \subseteq S$ . Then  $\varphi(S')$  is the Boolean value of  $\varphi$  when the states in S' are assigned 1 and the states in S-S' are assigned 0. An alternating finite automata [BL80,CKS81] (abbr. afa) A is a quintuple  $A = (\Sigma, S, g, \varphi_0, F)$ , where  $\Sigma$  is the input alphabet, S is the set of states  $\{s_1, \ldots, s_m\}$ ,  $g: \Sigma \times S \rightarrow B_S$  is the transition function that associates with each state and letter a Boolean formula in  $B_S$ ,  $\varphi_0 \in B_S$  is the start formula, and  $F \subseteq S$  is the set of accepting states. We can extend g to  $\Sigma \times B_S$ :  $g(a, \varphi)$  is obtained by substituting  $g(a, s_j)$  in  $\varphi$  for each  $s_j$ ,  $1 \le j \le m$ . The run of A on a word  $w = a_1, \ldots, a_l$  is the sequence  $\varphi_0, \ldots, \varphi_l$  of formulas from  $B_S$ , where  $\varphi_i = g(a_i, \varphi_{i-1})$ . A accepts w if  $\varphi_l(F) = 1$ .

Afa's define regular sets. Nevertheless, it follows from the results in [Le81,CKS81] that they can be exponentially more succinct than nfa's. That is, given any *n*-state afa, one can construct an  $2^n$ -state nfa that accepts the same language. Furthermore, for each *n* there is an *n*-states afa *A*, such that the language defined by *A* is not definable by any nfa with less than  $2^n$  states.

For simplicity we deal here only with the alternating analog of  $ETL_f$ .  $ATL_f$  is defined analogously to  $ETL_f$ , with afa connectives replacing nfa connectives. We require, however, that the start formulas of the afa connectives be either states or negation of states. For an afa  $A == (\Sigma, S, g, \varphi_0, F)$  and a formula  $\varphi \in B_S$ , we define  $A_{\varphi}$  to be the afa  $(\Sigma, S, g, \varphi, F)$ . The semantics of  $ATL_f$ are defined as follows:

- for an atomic proposition  $p, \pi \models p$  iff  $p \in \pi(0)$ .
- $\pi \models f_1 \land f_2$  iff  $\pi \models f_1$  and  $\pi \models f_2$ .
- $\pi \models \neg f$  iff not  $\pi \models f$ .

For an automata connective  $A = (\Sigma, S, g, \varphi_0, F)$  we have:

•  $\pi \models A(f_1, \ldots, f_n)$  if and only if  $\varphi_0(F) = 1$  or there are an  $f_j$  and a set  $S' \subseteq S$  such that  $i \models_{\pi} f_j$ ,  $g(a,\varphi_0)(S') = 1$ , for all  $s \in S'$  we have  $\pi^1 \models A_s(f_1, \ldots, f_n)$ , and for all  $s \in S - S'$  we have  $\pi^1 \models A_{\neg s}(f_1, \ldots, f_n)$ .

In §2 satisfaction is defined via some accepting run of the formulas over the structure. This kind of definition here would not correspond to our intuitive notion of automata running in parallel over the structure  $\pi$ , while the above definition does. Clearly,  $ATL_f$  is at least as expressive as  $ETL_f$ . Indeed, if we restrict the formulas in  $B_S$  to be positive disjunctions then  $ATL_f$ reduces to  $ETL_f$ . Also, there is an exponential translation from  $ATL_f$  to  $ETL_f$ . (Note that the translation must involve more than translating afa to nfa, since the semantics of  $ATL_f$  is not analogous to that of  $ETL_f$ .) The interest in this logic is twofold. First, since the translation from  $ATL_f$  to  $ETL_f$  causes a one exponential blow-up, one may expect  $ATL_f$  to be of higher complexity then  $ETL_f$ . Surprisingly, it has the same complexity. Furthermore,  $ATL_f$  is the natural "homeland" of the maximal technique, and it is theoretically interesting to pursue the technique to its limit.

Theorem 5.1:

- 1. Given an  $ATL_f$  formula f of length l, one can construct a Büchi automaton of size exp(l) that accepts exactly those sequences that satisfy f.
- 2. The satisfiability problem for  $ATL_f$  is complete in PSPACE.

Sketch of Proof: We prove here the first claim, and the second claim follows as in §2. The proof parallels the proof of Theorem 3.1. We are given a formula f, and we construct a model automaton, which is the cross product of the local automaton and the eventuality automaton. The notion of closure is similar to that in Theorem 3.1. For an  $ATL_f$  formula f, cl(f) is defined as follows:

•  $f \in cl(f)$ 

• 
$$f_1 \wedge f_2 \in cl(f) \rightarrow f_1 f_2 \in cl(f)$$

- $\neg f_1 \in cl(f) \rightarrow f_1 \in cl(f)$
- $f_1 \in cl(f)$  not of the form  $\neg f_2 \rightarrow \neg f_1 \in cl(f)$
- $A(f_1,\ldots,f_n)\in cl(f) \to f_1,\ldots,f_n\in cl(f)$
- $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in cl(f) \rightarrow A_s(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in cl(f),$ for all  $s \in S$ .
- $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in cl(f) \rightarrow A_{\neg s}(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in cl(f),$ for all  $s \in S$ .

# Constructing the Local Automaton

The local automaton is  $L = (2^{cl(f)}, N_L, \rho_L, N_f, N_L)$ . The state set  $N_L$  will be the set of all sets X of formulas in cl(f) that do not have any propositional inconsistency as in Theorem 3.1. For the transition relation  $\rho_L$ , we have that  $Y \in \rho_L(a, X)$  iff a = X and:

• For all  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in X$ , where

 $A = (\Sigma, S, g, \varphi_0, F)$ , either  $\varphi_0(F) = 1$  or there are an  $f_j$  and a set of states  $S' \subseteq S$  such that  $f_j \in X$ ,  $g(a_j, \varphi_0)(S') = 1$ , for all  $s \in S'$  we have  $A_s(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in Y$ , and for all  $s \in S - S'$  we have  $A \neg s(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in Y$ .

• For all  $\neg A(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in X$ , where  $A = (\Sigma, S, g, \varphi_0, F)$ , we have  $\varphi_0(F) = 0$  and for all  $f_j$  such that  $f_j \in X$  and all sets  $S' \subseteq S$  such that  $g(a_j, \varphi_0)(S') = 1$  either for some  $s \in S'$  we have  $\neg A_{\neg s}(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in Y$  or for some  $s \in S - S'$  we have  $\neg A_s(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in Y$ .

Finally, the set of starting states  $N_f$  consists of all sets X such that  $f \in X$ .

# The Eventuality Automaton

Given an  $ETL_f$  formula f, we defined the set e(f) of its eventualities as the subset of cl(f) that contains all formulas of the form  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n)$ . The eventuality automaton is  $E = (2^{cl(f)}, 2^{e(f)}, \rho_E, \{\emptyset\}, \{\emptyset\})$ , where for the transition relation  $\rho_E$ , we have that  $Y \in \rho_E(a, X)$  iff;

- $X = \emptyset$  and for all  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in a$ , where  $A = (\sum_i S_i, g_i, \varphi_0, F)$ , either  $\varphi_0(F) = 1$  or there are an  $f_j$  and a set of states  $S' \subseteq S$  such that  $f_j \in X$ ,  $g(a_j, \varphi_0)(S') = 1$ , for all  $s \in S'$  we have  $A_s(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in Y$ , and for all  $s \in S - S'$  we have  $A_{\neg s}(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in Y$
- $X \neq \emptyset$  and for all  $A(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in X$ , where  $A = (\sum_i S_i, g_i, \varphi_0, F)$ , either  $\varphi_0(F) = 1$  or there are an  $f_j$  and a set of states  $S' \subseteq S$  such that  $f_j \in X$ ,  $g(a_j, \varphi_0)(S') = 1$ , for all  $s \in S'$  we have  $A_s(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in Y$ , for all  $s \in S - S'$  we have  $A_{\neg s}(f_1, \ldots, f_n) \in Y$

# Combining the Automata

The model automaton is taken to be the cross product of the local automaton and the eventuality automaton. The model automaton is of size at most  $2^{4l}$ . Finally, we project the model automaton on  $2^{P}$ .

# 6. Concluding Remarks

Another approach to extend *PTL* was taken in [HP82]. They chose to extend the language by regular operators corresponding to concatenation and the Kleene star. This, however, pushes the decision problem for

their language to non-elementary complexity. Furthermore, it does not show the fine interplay between the different acceptance conditions that we have considered. These conditions can also be presented within the framework of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) [FL79]. Since we are reasoning here about computation paths, we consider PDL with one deterministic atomic program (1DPDL), where the structures are infinite sequences. In this framework, the finite acceptance condition corresponds to the diamond construct [FL79], the looping acceptance condition corresponds to the loop construct [HP79], and the repeating acceptance condition corresponds the the repeat construct [HP79]. It follows that adding to 1DPDL looping, repeating, fixpoint, and even quantification over propositions does not change the expressive power of the language and does not render it undecidable. This in sharp contrast with what happens for propositional dynamic logic in general. It is known that PDL is less expressive from PDL + loop (Pratt). which is less expressive than PDL + repeat [HS83], which is less expressive than PDL + fixpoint [Ko82], which can shown to be less be expressive than PDL + quantification. Also, the last language can even be shown to be highly undecidable ( $\Pi_1^1$  - complete).

The maximal model technique that we are using is also applicable to propositional dynamic logic, extending the results in [Pr81] for *flowchart* – *PDL*. Consider the logic *LPDL*<sub>alt</sub>, which is *PDL* augmented by the *loop* construct and with programs described by alternating finite automata. We can decide satisfiability for this logic by translating it into *PDL* + *repeat* and using the decision procedure of [St81], but that would take quintuply exponential time. By using the maximal model technique, we can not only give an exponential decision procedure, but also give a sound and complete axiomatization.

Another consequence concerns the relative expressive power of S1S, and WS1S (WS1S is S1S where quantification is only over finite sets). From the fact that we can simulate automata with repeating acceptance by automata with finite acceptance, it follows that quantification over arbitrary sets can be simulated by quantification over finite sets. That means that S1S and WS1S have exactly the same expressive power. This observation generalizes results appearing in [Bu62]. Acknowledgements. We'd like to thank R. Fagin, J. Halpern, and L. Stockmeyer for helpful comments.

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