

**Transmission Security
(TRANSEC) in an IP based
VSAT Architecture**

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As the ability to monitor satellite transmissions grows increasingly sophisticated, the need to implement increased levels of security becomes even more critical. In combatant situations, where even a small spike in traffic can be a critical piece of intelligence, the need to mask any communications activity becomes readily apparent. The National Security Agency (NSA) has outlined the following vulnerabilities inherent in an IP based TDMA transmission that must be addressed in order to provide true Transmission Security, or TRANSEC:

- ◆ *Channel Activity* – The ability to secure transmission energy to conceal traffic volumes.
- ◆ *Control Channel Information* – Disguise traffic volumes to secure traffic source and destination.
- ◆ *Hub and Remote Unit Validation* – Ensuring remote terminals connected to the network are authorized users.
- ◆ *Anti-Jam and Low Probability of Intercept* – While a consideration, this is not a mandate by the NSA or any other organization.

This paper will discuss elements and considerations of providing a TRANSEC compliant IP based VSAT network and the approach iDirect Government Technologies has taken to implement TRANSEC.

TRANSEC requires all network control channels and Management & Control (M&C) data to be encrypted and, that any and all traffic engineering information be obfuscated from an adversary. For example, TRANSEC requires a communications channel appear completely full to an adversary even if little or no actual data is flowing. This is contrasted with Communications Security or COMSEC, where the actual communications (e.g. voice, video or data stream) is encrypted but certain header information is sent in the clear. An example of COMSEC encryption in an IP network includes any High Assurance IP Encryptor (HAiPE) such as a KG 175 TACLANE or KG 235 SENTERA. While the encryption of a HAiPE device is virtually impenetrable, the information in the IP header including the source address, destination address and most importantly the ToS field are in the clear. With the IP header of a HAiPE encrypted packet in the clear an adversary can determine how much of the traffic stream is voice, video or data. More significantly an adversary could determine when high priority flash-override traffic has been initiated and from which location.

In an SCPC satellite network topology, achieving, TRANSEC compliance is relatively straight forward. For SCPC connections, a bulk encryptor such as a KIV 19A is employed to encrypt any data and control information traversing the network. If HAiPE COMSEC (High Assurance Internet Protocol Encryption,) encryption is employed in a TRANSEC SCPC network, the IP header of the HAiPE packet would be encrypted by the bulk encryptor prior to being transmitted to the satellite. In addition, since an SCPC link is static and always on and no control information needs to be exchanged between the SCPC modems, all of the TRANSEC requirements are met.

In a TDMA network TRANSEC compliance is substantially more difficult. A TDMA network dynamically allocates bandwidth to remotes; therefore, there must be some type of control information transmitted to each device in the network. This control data, containing traffic engineering information, as well as information available from a HAiPE encrypted IP packet header can be exploited by an adversary. For example, anomalous traffic volume to a specific remote can indicate new activity in that area while varying ratios of voice to data traffic can denote the distribution of intelligence (data) compared to lower priority voice traffic.

The security vulnerabilities of an IP based TDMA transmission have been defined in a number of NSA and DoD documents including the NSA's Kubic document and DoD's Deployed TRANSEC Whitepaper. Both papers define the security vulnerabilities of TDMA VSAT network. Following is an outline of the challenges that must be addressed according to the NSA and DoD and iDirect Government Technologies' response to those requirements.

Channel Activity

Challenge

The first vulnerability that exists in a TDMA network is the availability of traffic engineering information. In an SCPC network, the link is static with no variation in transmission characteristics based on end user communications. Therefore an adversary looking at a satellite transponder with a spectrum analyzer will see a constant RF signal. This is contrasted with a TDMA network. A TDMA in-route carrier energizes and de-energizes as traffic flows and stops. The on and off nature of a TDMA in-route is the natural extension of the ability to allocate satellite transponder space to remotes which have transient demands. While this characteristic makes TDMA networks much more bandwidth efficient, it allows an adversary to determine peak periods of activity, identify unusual or unexpected activity spikes and identify locations of remotes that have remained quiet for a period of time and suddenly experience increased traffic volumes. The obvious risk in having this information in the hands of an adversary is the potential to extrapolate timing, location of scale of strategic activity.

Solution

iDirect Government Technologies has implemented free slot allocation in its TDMA bandwidth distribution algorithm. With free slot allocation, an adversary snooping satellite transponder energies will see a constant "wall of data" regardless of traffic profiles. As the name implies, free slot allocation keeps the in-routes active regardless of actual traffic flows. Free slot allocation preserves the efficiencies of a TDMA system while obfuscating actual traffic volumes, negating the risk of using transmission activity as an intelligence gathering mechanism.

Control Channel Information

Challenge

A great deal of traffic volume and priority information can be gleaned by examining the in-band or out-of-band control information within a HAIPE encrypted TDMA network. As was previously discussed, the IP header of a HAIPE packet contains source, destination and priority information. In order for a TDMA network to be able to provide the quality of service needed to support real time traffic, data quantities and prioritization information must be gathered. This information could be even more useful to an adversary than channel activity data because, it is specific enough to delineate between general communications like email and web traffic, versus tactical communications like voice and video.

Solution

The only solution for this vulnerability is to completely encrypt all Layer 2 information as well as any control information disseminated to the remotes. The encryption methodology must be secure enough to thwart an adversary long enough that the data becomes old, and unusable. iDirect has implemented FIPS 140-2 certified 256 bit keyed AES encryption for all Layer 2 and control information. The encryption of the Layer 2 frames has a side benefit of re-encrypting the data payload. Therefore, the

transmitted HAIPE IP header itself is AES encrypted. Additionally, the iDirect TRANSEC TDMA slot is a fixed size, again to obfuscate any traffic characteristics. This Layer 2 encryption solution solves all existing control channel vulnerabilities. The iDirect Layer 2 encryption method goes a step beyond to feature over-the-air key update and a unique Layer 2 frame format including an Initialization Vector which ensures randomization of repetitive data streams. The net result is that adversaries are precluded from detecting any repetitive pattern, which can aid in deciphering encryption algorithms.

TDMA TRANSEC SLOT					
Encryption Header			Segment		FEC Coding
IV Seed	Key ID	Enc	Demand	LL Headers & Payload	

Figure 1

Hub and Remote Unit Validation

Challenge

One vulnerability of a TDMA VSAT system not addressed by either DoD or NSA is the concept of Hub and Remote Unit validation. In traditional SCPC architectures, when a link is established, it remains active for very long periods of time. Because these connections are fixed, and there is a significant level of coordination between personnel commissioning the SCPC, a high degree of confidence exists that an adversary is not trying to assume the identity of a trusted entity. In TDMA networks remotes are routinely coming into and dropping out of the network. This is especially true of networks with COTM (Communications on The Move) terminals where vehicles are traveling under bridges and behind buildings. This type of dynamic environment gives an adversary a greater opportunity to obtain a VSAT remote through licit or illicit channels, spoof the device ID and insert a rogue remote into a secure network. Equally feasible is an adversary acquiring a VSAT hub terminal and coaxing a blue force remote into the adversary's network.

Solution

To mitigate this risk, iDirect has implemented X.509 digital certificates on TRANSEC remotes. An X.509 certificate utilizes RSA public key encryption. With public key encryption two, related keys are generated, one private key and one public key. The functionality of these keys is such that anything encrypted with the public key can only be decrypted with the private key and anything encrypted with the private key can only be decrypted with the public key. In the iDirect system, X.509 certificates can be generated via the NMS server or they can be provided by a third party. Certificates are placed on all TRANSEC line cards and Protocol Processors as well as on the remotes. The hub system keeps the public keys of each remote configured to operate on the hub and the remotes have the public keys of each hub device. During network acquisition, the remote encrypts its X.509 certificate with its private key and the hub verifies by decrypting the certificate with the remote's public key and vice versa. This process ensures a remote is authorized to operate in the network as well as ensuring that the hub is a trusted entity.

Anti-Jam and Low Probability of Intercept

Challenge

While not a strict requirement of TRANSEC as defined by NSA or DoD, Anti-Jam and Low Probability of Intercept could prove useful in thwarting an adversary. The risk in any RF environment is the potential for an adversary to gain visibility into frequency activity which would enable signal jam with high energy radio frequencies. Both Anti-Jam and Low Probability of Intercept can be accomplished by employing Spread Spectrum technology/

Solution

iDirect has implemented a DSSS (Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum) waveform whose primary role is for COTM applications. This DSSS waveform could be used to spread the modulated energy to a level where it is virtually undetectable above the noise floor and could mitigate intentional interference projected over a sufficiently narrow bandwidth.

Conclusion

There are inherent benefits to the IP based TDMA platform that iDirect utilizes, with respect to bandwidth efficiency, scalability and the scope of applications that it enables. There also inherent security risks with a TDMA platform. The iDirect TRANSEC architecture is able to provide the highest levels of network security while maintaining the efficiencies and benefits of the TDMA architecture. iDirect Government Technologies has implemented the only TRANSEC and COMSEC compliant network architecture in the VSAT industry available today, which exceeds the requirements defined by NSA and DoD, while ensuring the QoS characteristics of the network are preserved.